Whether red-faced from anger or from embarrassment — or both — Vladimir Putin is not a happy camper these days. And it’s no wonder.

First, his most significant “client” in the Middle East — Syrian President Bashar al-Assad — is ousted in a coup that has sent him and his immediate family running to Moscow for asylum, leaving Syria in a precipitous political state, and the level of Russia’s influence in the Middle East in question.

Not to mention having to decide what to do with the Assad family in the long term.

He must also realize that Assad’s fall was at least partially his own fault — enabled by Russia’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine, drawing precious attention, money and personnel from its long-time assistance to Syria.

And what is he to do with the 6,000-7,000 troops he has stationed in Syria? Pull them out and send them to Ukraine? But then what happens to his airfield at Hmeimim and the naval facility at Tartus? The planes can be flown out; but the ships based at Tartus are unable to leave their Mediterranean port for their home on the Black Sea because of Turkey’s restriction of access through the Bosporus Strait. [Roksolana Bychai and Steve Gutterman, RFE/RL, December 13, 2024.]

Which also brings Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan into the picture as one of the most vital pieces on the chess board of Eurasian/Middle Eastern politics . . . the man who has mastered the art of fence-sitting in his geopolitically strategic position between East and West.

Next, Putin must come to grips with the fact that his “special military operation” in Ukraine has cost him far more dearly than he could ever have anticipated, in terms of money, manpower, and popularity in his own country. Tatyana Stanovaya, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, offered her view on X:

“Assad’s collapse has … shaken Putin, making him less inclined to demonstrate flexibility with Ukraine. The war in Ukraine has, to some extent, cost him Syria, which reinforces his unwillingness to compromise.” [Id.]

But Ruth Deyermond, a senior lecturer in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, foresees less of an effect on Ukraine:

“Given how tightly Putin’s presidency is tied to the war in Ukraine, how far he’s been willing to reshape Russian economy and society, how many lives he’s been willing to sacrifice for it, and how dependent he’s made Russia on other states (China, Iran, North Korea), it’s hard to imagine that the loss in Syria will make much difference because it’s hard to see how the Kremlin could take victory in Ukraine more seriously than they already do.”

It’s impossible to foretell the way in which events will ultimately play out. But Volodymyr Ohryzko, former Foreign Minister of Ukraine (2007-09) and presently head of a center for the study of Russia, had this to offer:

The “myth that Russia is great, invincible, and so forth — it’s all just propaganda. And I think this was seen clearly once again in many capitals, and it will influence all subsequent events. For us, I think this is a positive moment in our work with Western partners. And we must take advantage of this moment. . . .

“The Kremlin’s inability to take any serious steps to prevent this geopolitical humiliation [in Syria] shows how overstretched they are in Ukraine. That and the failure of Putin’s recent nuclear threats should encourage NATO members in their support for Ukraine.” [Id.]

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If I may take the liberty of once more calling upon the wisdom of my late Ukrainian grandmother:

“From his mouth to God’s ears.”

Just sayin’ . . .

Brendochka
12/14/24